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Abstract
The theory of exchange rate determination has evolved considerably in recent years. Starting from a
supposition that exchange rates were determined by Balance of Trade equilibrium, and hence-reflected "real"
factors, the resurgence of the Monetary Theory has caused a sharp change in perceptions as to how exchange
rates are determined. The Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments focused attention upon the role of
currencies as assets and hence viewed the exchange rate as a relative price of two assets. Thus, those factors
that, determine the demand for each currency - as well as the supply - are seen to explain exchange rates. Since,
in the context of the Monetary Approach the demands for currencies are generally transactions demands, and
since transaction demands for each currency are generally assumed proportional to nominal domestic output
(with, perhaps, the rate of interest also affecting transactions demand), the general conclusion emerges that
the exchange rate between two currencies will depend upon the ratio of domestic output levels, as well as the
ratio of currency supplies.
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Rational Expectations, Uncertainty and
Exchange Rate Determination
The theory of exchange rate determination has evolved considerably in
recent years. Starting from a supposition that exchange rates were determined
by Balance of Trade equilibrium, and hence-reflected "real" factors, the resur
gence of the Monetary Theory has caused a sharp change in perceptions as to how
exchange rates are determined. The Monetary Approach to the Balance of Payments
focused attention upon the role of currencies as assets and hence viewed the
exchange rate as a relative price of two assets. Thus, those factors that,
determine the demand for each currency - as well as the supply - are seen to
explain exchange rates. Since, in the context of the Monetary Approach the
demands for currencies are generally transactions demands, and since transaction
demands for each currency are generally assumed proportional to nominal domestic
output (with, perhaps, the rate of interest also affecting transactions demand),
the general conclusion emerges that the exchange rate between two currencies
will depend upon the ratio of domestic output levels, as well as the ratio of
currency supplies.
However, the rational expectations approach to exchange rate determination
takes this argument one step further. Under this approach, it is required that
the (expected) rate of return on the two assets are equal. To the extent that
currencies are held only for transaction purposes, that domestic currencies
must be held for domestic transactions, and that the use of a currency in this
context provides the holder of the currency with some benefit, then the rational
expectations approach cannot yield any real insight into exchange rate deter
mination without first specifying how the transactions demands are determined,
and what benefits are conferred by using a particular currency for a particular.
transaction. However, if the actual holding of currencies exceeds that needed
for transactions purposes, or if any currency can be used for transactions pur
poses, then one may view the holding of a particular currency as embodying
speculative purposes. As such, if the two currencies have equal value as trans
action media (including no value at the margin), then the rational expectations
approach does, indeed, yield insights into the process of exchange rate deter
mination.
It is this latter app,roach, followed by Kareken and Wallace (1977), which
leads to their somewhat surprising ~ and unsettling - conclusion that the .
exchange rate between currencies must be constant - but is indeterminate (also,
see Helpman and Razin (1979)). Once the assumptions are recognized, the conclu
sion seems apparent - since the two currencies have the same (perhaps zero)
value as transaction media, the period rate of return on them must be identical;
hence, the exchange rate must be constant. The fact that it is also indeter
minate (ex ante) reflects the self-fulfilling expectations nature of the
equilibrium.
While the approach taken by Kareken and Wallace* is a valuable contribution
in itself, the conclusion that exchange rates are insensitive to real or nomi
nal factors is unsettling, and seemingly inconsistent with observed phenomenon.
In the context of their model, differential growth rates of money supplies - or
output levels - will not affect the time path of the exchange rate (the level,
of. course, being indeterminate).
It is the purpose of this paper to demonstrate that the constant exchange
rate results are singular ones that are not robust to the introduction of
various forms of uncertainty into the model. In the context of the consumption-
loan model used by Kareken-Wallace, and to be employed here, uncertainty may
enter the model in several ways - uncertainty as to the beliefs of future
agents, uncertainty concerning future asset supplies or real output levels, and
iincortalnty conccrning govcrninGnt behavior. Since, for simpliciCy, we shall
work with a model in which all agents are identical, we shall focus on the
latter two types of uncertainty.
Suppose, for example, that money supplies are random. If, as predicted by
the Monetary Approach, exchange rates are proportional to money supplies, then
the exchange rate in any future period is also random. Hence, rational expec
tations does not explicitly require that the exchange rate is constant; rather,
it implies that the expected utility derived from holding each currency must be
equal. While a constant (indeterminate) exchange rate still represents an
equilibrium solution, we show in Section II that there is also a nonstationary
rational expectations solution that conforms to the predictions of the Monetary
Approach,
The above still leaves something of a quandary in explaining exchange rate
determination since multiple solutions exist. Again, the essence of the Kareken-
Wallace approach is that - since there is no explicit transactions demand for a
particular currency - the assets may be viewed as perfect substitutes; nothing
intrinsically identifies the dollar with U.S. output or wealth, the mark with
German output or wealth, etc. However, while agents may tend to view the
assets as perfect substitutes, there is scope for government policy. For
example, the institution of capital controls - banning domestics from holding
foreign currency and foreigners from domestic currencies - will eliminate the
perceived perfect substitutability of these currencies. Furthermore, while
there may be no current controls, it seems unlikely that any agent will attach
a zero probability to the event capital controls may be instituted in some
future period. Thus,' in Sections III and IV we analyze the implications of
assuming agents assign a positive probability to the event controls are imposed.
We show that this approach yields a unique (generally nonstationary) exchange
rate, and that this exchange rate is determined in accord with the implications
of the monetary approach. Furthermore, we show that as the (perceived) proba
bility of controls tends to zero, the exchange rate remains determinate. Hence,
the Kareken-Wallace results can be seen as singular ones associated with the
assumption agents hold the belief with probability one that governments will
never impose controls.
The plan of this paper is as follows. In Section I we develop our basic
consumption-loan model of individual behavior, and use it to derive agents'
demand for currencies under rational expectations. We show that - in a world
of perfect certainty - the Kareken-Wallace results provide the only (set of)
solutions. In Section II we introduce (exogenous) uncertainty concerning cur
rency supplies and show that ~ in addition to the Kareken-Wallace solutions -
there is also a solution in which exchange rates are proportional to asset
supplies. We-also show how changes in the expected rate of growth - or in the
variability - of asset supplies affects the exchange rate. In Section III we
introduce endogenous uncertainty - i.e., the belief by agents that governments
may impose capital controls. Assuming future currency supplies and output
levels are known with certainty, we show how the (unique) exchange rate is
determined and how differential real growth rates or differences in the growth
rates of money supplies affects the exchange rate. Finally, in, Section IV we
reintroduce uncertainty concerning asset supplies and real output levels, and
show how the combination of endogenous and exogenous uncertainty affects
exchange rate determination.. We conclude with suggestions for future research.
I) The Basic Model
In order to explain exchange rate determination, it is necessary to first
specify the macro asset demands; it is the purpose of this section to show how
the asset and commodity demands are derived from the optimizing behavior of
agents under uncertainty. In subsequent sections, these macro relationships
are used to characterize the equilibrium exchange rate(s) under alternative
sources of uncertainty.
The model we employ is the standard Samuelson (1958) overlapping genera
tional consumption loan model. There are two countries, the 'home country
(U.S.), and the "foreign" country (Germany). Individuals in each country are
assumed to live for two periods - working, and deriving income, in the first
period of life, and consuming in each period. There are Npeople in each gen
eration in each country; hence, at any time, t, (2N) people are alive in each
country. Further, it is assumed that, within each country, all individuals of
the same generation have the same income (received in the first period of life).
Finally, we assume all individuals (of all generations) have identical prefer
ences, and that all agents have rational expectations.
!
Each country is assumed to have its own currency; the supply of the "home"
(U.S.) currency at time t, called dollars, is denoted by D^, whereas that of
the "foreign" currency, called marks, is denoted by These supplies may
change over time; define
^ = ^\-l> ^ = 't\-l
Thus, (X^-1), (X^-1) are the period rates of growth of the two currencies.
It is further assumed that commodities are perishable, and that these two
currencies are the only stores of value. Thus, = (X^ -
viewed as the net transfer (or tax) at time t to U.S. residents; similarly,
(X -Dm is the net transfer at t to German residents. For simplicity, it is
t . t-1
assumed these transfers or taxes are given to (levied upon) the then working
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generation.
We assume there is a single homogeneous commodity, produced in each
country; aggregate U.S. (German) output at t is denoted by (Q^)* The
dollar (mark) price of goods is denoted by P^(P^), and the dollar/mark exchange
rate at time t by e^. Hence, commodity arbitrage implies:
2) P,
The income (in dollars) of a representative member of generation t is given
by:
3) yt ^ N / \
where, throughout, the bar (—) above variables refers to the foreign country.
As'noted earlier, ((X^-1)D^_^/N) represents the net per capita transfer'at t
to the young in the U.S.
Individual preferences are given by:
4) U = — a < 1, a 7^ 0
t a
= InC^ + In , a =0
where is consumption at t by individual i of generation t, and ( is
consumption at (t+1) by that same individual.
Governments do not fix exchange rates; hence, exchange rates are determined
by supply.and demand. If there are no capital controls, agents are free to
hold either currency, and it is assumed that there is no explicit transactions
demand for either currency. Assuming there are no capital controls, agents
born at t are assumed to determine current consumption (C^)> plus portfolio
holdings (D^, M^) after current prices (P^, e^) are known, but before next
period prices ^t+1^ known. However, in making these decisions,
agents are assumed to have rational expectations (i.e., the probability distri
butions they assign to ®t+l equal to the true distributions). Assum
ing they leave no bequests, their intertemporal budget constraint is:
6) < (yj - P^cJ)
where (D^, M^) is the portfolio chosen at t, (y - P cj;) is nominal savings (in
t t L L U
dollars) at t, and (dJ + is the dollar value of the portfolio at
(t+1). Since nonsatiation and the Inada derivative conditions hold, (5) and
(6) will be equalities. Hence:
4+1 = t^^t - '^^ t^ + ^"t+i - \)<i/''t+i
Note that capital gain (in dollars) due to mark
holdings. Barring short sales:
8) £ 0,
- P
•^t t t
Thus, at t, expected utility for the young is given by:
9) = E[Uj,] = t+1
= E
/ i
In + In
^t - ^'t +
\ t+1
a < 1, 0
a = 0.
The expectation in (9) runs over ^t+1 '^ yields.
9U.
10)
9C
3U
11)
aM
^ E
j =
i a/2-1 ift+lV
^ ^t+1
- 0.
<
= 0
Note that (10), (11) hold for a = 0 as well. If (11) is positive at
. a corner solution results with = 0; similarly, if (11) is
y^-P
= I t t
t V e
negative at == 0, then the optimal decision is = 0; otherwise, an interior
solution results.
Regardless of the portfolio decision, it is readily seen that the optimal
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consumption rule is given by:
12) = (yJ/2P^).
The utility function employed implies individuals possess constant relative
risk aversion of degree (1-a); hence, the optimal portfolio rule-may be expressed
in terms of the per cent of wealth held in each currency. Define:
i \2e M 2D'
13) m7 = ; (1-m^) =
14)
9M^
1 +
1 _
) =
t
m
1-m
where is the ratio of (current) wealth held in marks to dollars. Using (12)
and (13), (11) may be rewritten as: ^
\ a/2-1
.a/2-1 /e
t+1
where, for an interior solution, (14) holds with equality. Note that (12)
and (14) hold for residents of either country, assuming no capital controls,
since all agents have identical preferences and since there is no explicit
transactions demand for either currency.
If, at time t, capital controls are imposed, then the new generation (of
each country) is prohibited from acquiring foreign currency for use in the next
period. Thus, they are forced to hold the domestic currency as the only store,
of value. However, the' retired of the previous generation are allowed to dis
pose of their foreign currency holdings,for goods or domestic currency (and
*a/2
t+1
ultimately goods). Consequently, even if capital controls are imposed, commodity
arbitrage will hold, and an equilibrium exchange rate is determined. From the
previous analysis, it is clear that the consumption rule of the young is unal
tered; however, their portfolio decisions are, of course, constrained. In
c cparticular, for U.S. residents, under capital controls, m^ = 0, 1**™^ ~
whereas for German residents, m^ = 1, ~ (the c superscript stands for
controls). We now turn to consider the macro equilibrium.
A) Macro Equilibrium - No Capital Controls
Since all agents have identical preferences, and since the retired spend
all of their wealth, aggregate commodity demand, (C^ + C^) using (3) and (12),
is given by:
15) P^(G° +C°) - +f(y^ +y^)
= [P^CQ^. + \) +Vl^^ Vl/2,
where, of course, aggregate supply is (Q^ + Q^.)* Since all agents of both
countries allocate their wealth in the same fashion, asset market equilibrium
is given by:
16) ^ ^t
Using (1), (3), (13), we have, for commodity and asset market equilibrium:
1+X
+
18) ^'
L- U ^
Leading the time subscript forward one period gives the equilibrium values of
or - given information available at t, gives the probability dis-
trlbutions of ^t+1^* choosing agents use the true probability
distributions for ®t+l^
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B) Macro Equilibrium - Capital Controls
If capital controls occur, then asset market equilibrium entails:
19) pX =
Hence:
21) e^ =:•ftxfexa
where, as earlier, the superscript implies the presence of controls. Again,
leading t forward by one period in (19) - (21) gives the equilibrium values at
(t+1) , and the distributions of ^t+1^ based on information available at
t. Under rational expectations, agents use these distributions (and the proba
bility of controls) in choosing
Using the analysis of this section, we now turn to address the issue of
exchange rate determination under alternative forms of uncertainty.
II) Uncertain Asset Supplies and Exchange Rate Determination
Assume in this section that all agents assign a zero probability to the
event capital controls may occur; the only sources of uncertainty arise from
(potentially) random asset or output supplies. Individual portfolio decisions
are given by (14); from (14) it is clear that if no uncertainty is present,
then the only rational expectations solution is given by ®
Hence, under certainty, we obtain the Kareken-Wallace solution that the
exchange rate is constant over time - but indeterminate.
Even if asset or output supplies are random, it is clear that the Kareken-
Wallace solution is still valid; if all agents believe the exchange rate will
remain constant for all time, then it will remain constant. However, nothing
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indicates how the level of the exchange rate is determined. In addition, the
issue arises as to whether a nonconstant exchange rate solution exists under
uncertainty.
From (17) and (18):
22)
't+1 ^ / '^ t+l\ / ^t+1
' ^t+1 ^t+1 ^^t+1 ^t+1^
Substituting (22) into (14) yields:
E
a/2-l/^t+l
a/2
where the expectation runs over ^t+1' ^t+1* \+l^ ^t+1
t+1
t+1
nonconstant). Again, note that ~ "^t * X or = e^ is. a solution
to (23).
Assuming output disturbances are not correlated with money supply, then
the output uncertainty will not affect the equilibrium value of Further-^
more, since the remain^g terms do not involve D^, it is clear that - if an
interior solution to (23) exists, it will be a stationary one (i.e.,
provided and are not serially correlated. Hence, the equilibrium
value of ^ (if one exists) is determined by:
24) JW =E[(T+:|)A)"^^"^(X-I)(X(1+X)+4>X(1+X))"°'^ ^] =0
In (24), we drop the time subscripts, because the distributions of (X, X) are
stationary. An interior solution will exist if, and only if, J(0) > 0 > lim J(4')
Whether or not such a solution exists depends on the distributions of (X, X);
and if one exists, the (unique) equilibrium value of 4> will also depend on
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these distributions. Since e^ = it follows .that the (unique) nonsta-
tionary solution for the exchange rate will depend not only on relatxve asset
I
supplies, but also on the distributions of these supplies.
An interior solution may fail to exist if either the (expected) rate of
growth of one currency is considerably larger than that of the other, or if the
supply of one asset is much more variable than that of the other. For example,
suppose I =1, E(X) =1, E[(X-1)^] >0. From (24), evaluted at $=0:
25) J(0) =EEOt-DCl+X)""^^] 7 0 as a 0.
Thus, for a ^ 0, T =1, E(X) = 1, the only solution is cf) = 0 (which is part of
the Kareken-Wallace set). Note that the variability in dollar supply eliminates
demand for the mark!^ Similarly, if X= 1, E(X) > 1, then:
-^^^1 =/^—77^ [1-E(1/X)]
Clearly, if .E(l/X) <1, then no interior solution exists, and (() = «' is the only
solution (again part of the Kareken-Wallace set).^ Thus, corner solutions may
result from large differences in variability or expected rates of growth of
asset supply.
On the other hand, if (X, X) are identically, but independently, distri
buted, then the symmetry of (24) makes it clear = 1, represents
a rational expectations solution. In general, then, one expects that the
equilibrium <J) (and hence e^) depends on the relative means and variances of the
two distributions.. While an explicit solution to (24) cannot be found, a
reasonable approximation, for small disturbances and small deviations of means
(from each other), can be obtained. Let:
27) X' = 1+8^+^2 '^
26) lim J(tl)) = E
(fl-vco
X = 1 + 3^ - parameters
13
' _ 2 2 2 2
Thus, E(X) =1+3-l» the variances of (X, X) are given by (3^^ » ^3^ ^ respec
tively. Using (27) in (24) define:
28) J*((l), B) =E[(X+(j)X)"''^ "^(X-X) (X(l+X) +(jjX (l+X))°'^ ]
Given the distributions of A, A, J* depends on (41, 3); an interior solution
entails J*(4>, 3) = 0-
For small 3, (28) may be approximated by a Taylor series expansion, retain
ing the first three terms:
3 33^
29) 8) =J*(4>, 0) + 1: ^ (•!>, 0)B^ +1 _E X 3e.3B.
i=l i 1-1 J-1 1 J
where J*, and its respective partial derivatives, are evaluated at 3=0. From (27)
and (28), J*((t),0) =0. After performing the necessary calculations, one obtains.
30) JA(<|), 3) = /^/2+i) 2 [233^(l+<t)) +V^{33(^+ 2) - ^2^2'^
'2 2 2 2
where, in (30), it has been assumed 3^ is small (relative to V or V3^) •
Note that, for 33^=0, 32=^3, as found earlier. Similarly, if 32=&3=0,
3^>0 no interior solution exists (4)=«). Also, if 3^=0, 83=0, 32^0, then tf)-0 for
a^O. Thus, while (30) may not be exact, its properties conform with those pre
viously discussed.^ From (30):
31) !)> =0if 2gj^ +V^(2B3 - f 02^ 1 0
((. = =0 if 2Bj^ " ^^2^ - °
2S, +V^(2g^ - f B^)
0 < <(. ? 7 rt 2 otherwise.
. -2Sj^ +V^(2B2 - 2 ^3^
Thus, a corner solution will occur if either 6^ is very different, from zero, or
else if a>0, and .the differences in variances of money supply are large.
Assuming an interior solution exists, we obtain from (31).
32) ||- =V^(4-a)(B2+e3)(G"^)'^ > 0; G= (2^1 "f ®3^ " °
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-2.-133) = -V^(4-a) +|) ] (G )
362
34) =.V^(4-a)[-e +V^g2(l +|) ] (G ^) ^
^83
Consider first a change in 3^^. An increase in the expected rate of growth
of dollar supplies will cause current mark demand to rise; which in turn leads
to a current depreciation of the dollar (although asset supplies have not
changed yet), and an increase in the dollar prices of goods.^ This result is
very similar to those found in which explicit transactions•demands for curren
cies are assumed; in those cases, the anticipation of dollar supply increases
in the future reduce dollar demands since, essentially, the cost of holding
dollars has risen. This, in turn, leads to a current depreciation of the dollar
and an increase in dollar commodity prices (see, for example, Fischer [1979]).
It, is important to note, however, that we do not postulate a transactions demand
for dollars, nor do' we have an explicit opportunity cost for holding dollars
(and our model is stochastic, rather than deterministic). Nevertheless, our
results replicate those obtained in which an explicit transactions demand is
used. Of course, the increase in the expected rate of growth of dollars will
lead to a decline in the future (expected) value of the dollar for two reasons -
the likely increase in future dollar supplies, and the shift in asset demand
away from the dollar.
Next, consider how a change in the variance of the rate of growth of dollar
7 ' g Oj ^
supply affects the current exchange rate. For 3-, = 0 (E(X) = E(X)), " 0
a ^ (-4); also, the larger is 3^^ (ceteris paribus), the more likely it is
< 0.^ While it may seem paradoxical that an increase in the variability of
dollar supplies will increase the demand for dollars (if agents are not too
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risk averse),, it really is simply an application of Jensen's inequality - and
hence another example that price variability can benefit (some) -individuals.
To see this, consider an agent with a given basket of currencies at t, while
the supply of dollars at (t+1) is random. An increase in dollar supply at
(t+1) will cause dollar prices to rise, the dollar to depreciate against the
mark, and the real income of the retired will fall; a decrease in dollar sup
plies will have the opposite effect (unless only marks are held). It is clear
that the individual could (partially) hedge this risk by increasing his holdings
of marks; however, it is also well-known that price variability can be benefi- ^
cial, particularly if agents are not too risk averse. Thus, if agents are not
"very" risk averse (a > -4), the increased variability of real income associ
ated with dollar holdings appears desirable and - rather than hedging - the
individuals desire to magnify the risk by increasing current dollar holdings,
consequently causing the dollar to appreciate. However, for very risk averse
agents (a > -4), the hedging motive dominates, and the increased variability of
dollar supply causes a depreciation of the dollar.
This concludes our analysis of this section. We have shown that if cur
rencies are in random supply, then - in addition to the Kareken-Wallace self-
fulfilling expectations solution - there is an alternative solution whose pro
perties are similar to those obtained from the Monetary Approach to the Balance
of Payments, in which explicit transactions demands are postulated. However,
we have seen only nominal - and not real - factors influence this equilibrium.
Thus far, there is little to indicate which exchange rate solution is more
robust; and, if the Kareken-Wallace results are accepted, there is nothing to
indicate what the equilibrium exchange rate will be. It is the purpose of the
next two sections to eliminate that impasse.
16
III) Government Controls and Exchange Rate Determination
In this section we wish to concentrate upon the role played by probabilis
tic capital controls; toward that end, we assume the agents know with certainty
the future time path of asset and output supplies. In the next section we will
reintroduce uncertainty concerning those variables.
While it is not the purpose of this paper to discuss optimal governmental
foreign exchange policy, it is worth pointing out that there is some (nonpoli-
tical) rationale for such controls. Assuming no exogenous uncertainty and no
capital controls, the only equilibrium exchange rate will be constant over time.
Suppose, for example, German output grows more rapidly than U.S. output. Given
the constant exchange rate, Germany will be perpetually exporting commodities
and importing paper money. Under these circumstances, the imposition of capi
tal controls would prove beneficial to German residents. Similarly,, if the
supply of dollars increases more rapidly than that of marks, then - given the
constant exchange rate - the U.S. will run a perpetual trade deficit, exporting
dollars (and inflation), in return for commodities, Once again, the German
government has an incentive to impose such controls. Thus, there would, seem
to be a strong rationale for considering the impact of such (probabilistic)
controls on exchange rates.
Assume, then, that in any period, t, there is a probability (ir) that con
trols will be imposed, and hence (1-tt) is the probability there will be no
controls. For simplicity, we assume ir is time-independent; i.e., the ex ante
probability of controls in any period is stationary and independent of the
history or current state of the economy. If controls occur at (t+1), the price
level and exchange rate are given by (19) - (21); if no controls occur, then
(17) - (18) determine the price level and exchange rate for that period (with't
replaced by (t+1), of course).
17
The agent must determine his optimal portfolio rule, given full knowledge
of the time path of assets and output supplies, and his (rational) expectations
concerning the likelihood of controls next period and of the behavior of agents
next period. If controls are currently in force, the agent has no decision to
make; if not, his decision is determined by (14), where, as earlier, the expec
tation operator runs over (e^..^,^, P,.^^). Recognizing the only source of uncer
tainty is due to the possibility of controls, and using (lA), the agent s
portfolio decision is given by:
aiVi f -'V;:f35) (I-tt) 1 +
36)
^'''t+l^t+1
/ 't+1 \
- 1
s ^ /
C C
where (e^+i* ^t+1^ (t+1) Prices in the absence of controls, and ^t+1^
are (t+I) prices with controls present. Substituting (17), (18), (19) and (21)
in (35), and simplifying yields:^^
a/2-1
+ TT
(pC -a/2
^ t+1^
1 +
= 0
.-ct/2
where "
(36) is a first-order nonlinear difference equation in clearly, the
solution will depend on it. For it = 0, the (set of) solutions are given by.
'•'t+i t+1 , . t
"i; 1 ; or 4) = a • 5-
•"t \+l '
and indeterminate - exchange rate is the only solution set.
Hence, for tt « 0» the Kareken-Wallace constant -
18
However, for tt > 0 it is clear that the Kareken-Wallace solution will not
work unless
Yt+1
^t+2
1+X
\ t+2/ 1+X
"t+i
\+i
, and even in this case the
exchange rate will be determinate (but constant). Thus, the constancy and
indeterminacy of the exchange rate is a singular result that hinges upon the
assumption all agents attach a probability of zero to the possibility of capital
controls. .
To get an idea of the properties of a solution for it 0, suppose the
growth rates of outputs and money supplies are constant:
37) = X, X^_^^ = ^ ^t+1 " • ^0
where 0 is the relative growth rates of real output, Yq = no(dif
ferential) real growth (0=1), (36) becomes:
38) :(l-ii)^l+YQ)"''^ (X+if>X)"^^~^(a+X)'x+<l>X(l+I))~"''^ if>(>^-^ +Tr]((l+^)
+Yq(i+x))°^^"^ (i+I)~"^^(i+x)"°"'^ (yq(i+x) - 4.(1+X)^ =0
In (38), the time subscript on ij) is omitted, since it is clear - with constant
Y - that the solution is time independent.
^ ^ is the unique (and!For X ='X, (|> = Ya» hence e = <Ji
t
constant) exchange rate, which is independent of tt. Note that - unlike, dur
results of Section II - real factors (y) must influence the equilibrium exchange
rate. -The reason for this is clear —with no specific transactions demand for
either currency and with no probability of controls, there is nothing that
associates the demand for a currency with the output of the country that issued
that currency. However, if tt > 0, then in some future period the demand for
dollars will be associated with U.S. output, and hence the current exchange
rate must reflect that.
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For X ^ Xy the solution for is stationary, but clearly the exchange rate
(controlled or uncontrolled) will change over time. Also, if X X, then ^
will depend on tt, the probability of controls. Let: ,
39) (}>•= a'
/1+X>
'-A
Substituting (39) in (38), and simplifying, yields:
.a/2-1
40)
(¥)• - iT(a-l) = 0
> > —
Hence, a — 1 as X — X.
/l+X
\1+X
Suppose,, for example, X > X. Then ~
"t+1 - d^
Vi ' \
M- f
If anyone
is to be induced to hold dollars at t (assuming no controls then), it must be
D
triie that Since e
t+1
it follows that this condition
/1+X\ ^
holds. Hence:
41) X > T: e
t+1
= a
/l+X^
l+X/
D
t+1
M
^t+l
l+x\ °= Y
\l+xj
t c
M. ^ ®t '
> e = a
t
a > 1
<S) M^. t+1
for X < X, a < 1, and the direction of the inequalities is reversed.
Thus, the exchange rate will be nonstationary, though it does not (neces
sarily) monotonically increase over time (X > X) because of controls; however,
the uncontrolled exchange rate controlled exchange rate (e^) each
increase at the rate (X/X). As is clear from (40), a depends on it. Further,
it is readily seen that ~ <0 (X > X), and > 0, (X < X). As it 1, a -+ 1;
however, as tt ->• 0, a -»• •*> for X > X (a ->• 0, X < X) . In the absence of supply
uncertainty, an interior solution requires some likelihood of controls. It is
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interesting to note that - for tt e 0, the exchange rate is constant (and inde
terminate) - whereas for tt close to zero, the value of the more rapidly growing
currency will be small. Hence, it would seem that - from the point of view of
the country whose currency grows less rapidly - a small, but positive probability
of controls is desirable.
From (40), it can be seen that for Xnear ff" ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
thus, the growth rate of a currency affects the equilibrium exchange rate, not
just by affecting asset supplies, but also through shifting demand. In particular,
for X> A, an increase in the rate of growth of the dollar will cause agents to
shift away from dollars, causing an immediate depreciation of the currency.
This is analogous to the results of Section II in which the asset supplies were
uncertain.
Returning to (36), it is clear that if outputs grow at different rates, the
solution for ^ is nonstationary. Assume X=X, and becomes:
= (l^m^).42) (i-.)y,,,-y, = ^
For IT =0, y^ is constant, but indeterminate; however, for any -ft > 0, a unique
solution exists; it is given by:
43) = + . t>0.
Further, since y^ e (0, 1), and since the second term of (43)-is bounded above
by 1, it-is clear a^ = 0, i.e., the boundary conditions imply the homogeneous
solution vanishes. Hence:
, (I-tt)'-44) = , „t+i+i
1=01 d+YQe" " n
Thus, ^ as 0 ^ 1; for 0 >1 (0 ,< 1), e^., e^. both Increase (decrease)
over time. Further, since;
and since (l+YQ0^"*"^)y^ —1 as 0—1, it follows that:
46) 0 >l: e^^^ >e^ >e^^^ •; 0 <1: <e^^^
as required by an interior solution. As for the case of monetary growth,
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t <—0 as 0 —1; as ir 0, '"j 0 > 1 0, 0 < .!)• Thus, the limiting
9Tr
solution, as TT -> 0, is that one currency is valueless.
Finally, if we write (44) as:
a-TT)^ D47) y = .TT S—' ^ =( T~j M '
^ i=0 (1+Yt-Q ) \
it is clear, given that an increase in Odecreases y^ (0 > 1); hence, for
any given current state (y^)> the more rapid is the German growth rate relative
to the U.S., the lower will be the current value of the dollar, as agents anti
cipate the more rapid depreciation of the currency.
Thus far, we have demonstrated two separate reasons why the constant,
indeterminate exchange rate may not be a (the only) solution. If asset supplies
are uncertain, the Kareken-Wallace solution still holds, but an alternative
solution will (may) exist. Furthermore, if agents believe there is any positive
probability that foreign exchange controls will be used at some future date,
then the Kareken-Wallace solution fails; for this case, an alternative (unique)
exchange rate exists that conforms to the predictions of the Monetary Approach
concerning the impact of real and' nominal factors on the exchange rate. In our
final section we integrate these two separate sources of uncertainty.
IV) 'Controls arid Asset Supply Uncertainty
The proceeding sections have indicated how exchange rates maybe dete:rminate
in the presence of alternative sources of uncertainty, and have shown that the
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Kareken-Wallace stationary exchange rate may not be an equilibrium solution (or
the only equilibrium solution). In our final section, we combine the two
sources of uncertainty - asset supplies are random, and controls are deemed
possible. For simplicity, we assume real output levels do not change over
time.
As earlier, the agents* asset demands are determined by (lA). If no
controls are present next period, then that period's exchange ra,te and price
level is given by (17, 18); if controls are present, they are given by (19) -
(21). Hence, the equilibrium exchange rate at t - given expectations and
assuming agents attach a probability ti to controls next period - is given by
(35), recognizing ^t+1 random (due to asset supply uncertainty):
a/2-1
35') (l-Tr)E
r ✓ \a/2-l y V
(%-K4"
+ ttE 1 +
't+1 i
Assuming = Yq all t, and using (17) - (21), we have:
48)
.all
0
-a/2
where (48) is identical to (36) with the exception of uncertainty concerning
X X ,. As seen earlier, if tt « 0, then multiple solutions exist, including
t+1' t+1
/ wthe Kareken-Wallace solution ^(()^ =a • J, as well as one in which <() is sta
tionary. However, for any tt > 0, it is clear the Kareken-Wallace solution can
not hold. Assuming that ^t+1^ have stationary distributions, it is
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apparent from (48) —due to the absence of a state variable - that the unique
solution for is stationary.
Define cf)* as the stationary solution (for (}>) to (48) for tt E 0; as seen in
Section III, such a solution will exist if the distributions of (X, \) are simi
lar, Also, the value of will depend upon the moments of the distributions,
as discussed in Section III. It is clear, however, that (}>* is independent of
Yq - i.e., it is not influenced by real factors.
Further, define as the solution to (48) for tt = 1; i.e., 0 solves:
In (49), the time subscripts are omitted due to the stationarity of (X, X).
Clearly, a solution for always exists, and it is apparent that this solution
depends on real factors (y) » well as the distributions of (X, X).. For
example, if (X, X) are identically - but independently distributed, then
Max[YQ, 1] 1 ^Min[YQ, 1]. Thus, for >1, and clearly
3To
> 0.
Since (48) is monotonic in 0, it follows that, for any fr e (0, 1), the
solution 4) e (<(»*'•, 0^). Thus, for example, if (})^ .> <|i*, then as tt decreases from
1 to 0, (|) decreases from to <J>*. Note that, as tt 0, a unique solution
exists ("J)*) > even though for ir = 0, multiple equilibria occur.
Further^ from the prior analysis, it is clear that the current exchange rate
will reflect not only current factors (real output supplies and asset supplies),
but also, expectational factors. From our prior analysis, it is clear that an
increase in the expected rate of growth of dollars will cause an immediate
depreciation of the currency, as in the case when a specific transactions
demand is posited. Finally, note that the presence of uncertainty coiiceming
asset supplies and concerning exchange controls tends to cause the currency of
24'
the less productive country to be overvalued. In the case where (X, X) are
Identically distributed, then (J)* = 1 < < Yf-,, for Y ^ l* Hence, for any
- ' ^t ' ^tIT ^ 1, the current exchange rate (in the absence of controls) is e^ '
^ • t t
whereas were controls enacted at t: e^ = Yn 7:
t 0 M
\
VI) Conclusion
Using an overlapping generations model, we have shown how exchange rates
are determined in a world of uncertainty, assuming agents have rational expec
tations. We have demonstrated that when asset supplies are random then, in
addition to the self-fulfilling constant exchange rate solution, an alternative
solution in which the exchange rate reflects current asset supplies also exists.
Moreover, we have shown that the properties of this latter solution are similar
to those obtained using an explicit transactions demand for money in that changes
in the expected growth rate of a currency will affect the current exchange rate.
However, neither the Kareken-Wallace solution, nor this alternative solu
tion, reflect real factors in that agents of both countries maintain the same
portfolio. In addition, nothing indicates how to choose between these alterna
tive solutions. However, once agents believe there is any positive probability
of controls, the indeterminacy of the exchange rate vanishes, and the unique
exchange rate will be responsive to both monetary and real factors. Furthermore,
we have shown that the self-fulfilling expectations solution is a singular one,
in that, for any positive probability of controls, it does not represent a
solution, and as the probability tends to zero a unique (nonstationary exchange
rate) solution exists. We believe that it would be interesting to extend the
model to consider alternative stores of value, such as real capital. Further,
insights into the exchange rate determination process would be gained by con
sidering an activist monetary policy and an endogenous probability of controls.
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FOOTNOTES
^ Little in the following analysis would be altered if these changes in
money supply were viewed as being caused by government purchases or sales of
commodities.
^ This is readily seen from the Kuhn Tucker conditions when optimizing
a
+ ^[yt~^t-^t"°t"^t^t^ * However, the treatment
in the text is more succinct.
^ If a < 0, an interior solution will exist for this case.
^ By Jensen's inequality, E[l/X] > ' hence, E(X) > 1 is a necessary,
but not sufficient, condition for this result.
^ Computer simulations for binomial distributions indicate the approximation
is quite good.
^ If the increase (decrease) in the expected rate of growth of dollar
supplies is viewed as transitory, a depreciation (appreciation) of the dollar
and rise (fall) in dollar prices of goods will still occur, but not by as much
as if the change is viewed as a permanent one. Hence, the efficacy of a (an
announced) policy change depends on both the short-run and long-run beliefs of
agents.
^ For brevity, we restrict ourselves to considering ; note, however,
2 —
that the results for changes in are symmetric. Since 3^ = E[X] - E[X], we
have: ^ =V [4-a] [E(X-I)+vS^(l+^)]G-2and =-V^A^a) [E(X-X)V4(1+f)
2
^ For an interior solution, [~"f" ^ ^ thus, for
a >. 0 interior solution, —^ <0 regardless of 3^.
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For' the simple closed economy,
D (1+X )
—= = : hence, for the retired
\+i
. Let E(X^,t) =1; then: E[R^j_^] =^Qt+1'' "'•''t+1' rt+1
^ ^t+i V"
Q.-l
-T—- , and the.money supply variability raises expected consumption.>
For expected utility in this case, E
(Wa) •• a -2. Thus, the money supply variability can be viewed as a
benefit by a retired individual who is not too risk averse.
While in this simplistic model, capital controls in all periods would
be desirable from the German perspective, we do not mean to imply we favor such
a policy. There are strong reasons - in more sophisticated models - for not
always imposing such controls; among them are included the role of exogenous
uncertainty and the risk-sharing afforded by temporary trade deficits or sur
pluses. However, even under uncertainty, if growth rates are divergent, some
probability of such controls would be desirable. For details, see Lapan and
Enders [1980b].
it is clear that, in the presence of possible controls (it > 0), an
interior•solution must exist since, if controls occur, each currency will have
a non-zero, finite Value.
12
For details on the case in which output supplies are random,, see Lapan
and Enders [1980b].
v^wi
27
REFERENCES
Fischer, Stanley, 1979, Anticipations and the nonneutrality of money, Journal
of Political Economy 87, April, 225-52.
Helpman, Elhanan and Assaf Razin, 1979, Towards a consistent comparison of
alternative exchange rate systems, Canadian Journal of Economics 12,.
August, 394-409.
Kareken, John and Neil Wallace, 1977, Samuelson's consumption loan model with
country specific fiat monies. Staff Report of the Federal Reserve Bank of
Minneapolis 24.
Lapan, Harvey and Walter Enders, 1980a, Stochastic disturbances and the choice
of exchange regime in an intergenerational model. Journal of International
Economics 10, May, 263-83. ^
Lapan, Harvey and Walter Enders, 1980b,, Capital controls and exchange rate
determination in a rational expectations framework, unpublished manuscript
(Iowa State University) Staff Series Paper no. 101.
Mussa, Michael, 1978, The exchange rate, the balance of payments,'and monetary •
and fiscal policy under a regime of controlled floating, in: Jacob Fenkel
and Harry Johnson, eds.. The economics of exchange rates (Addison-Wesley,
Reading, MA).
Samuelson, Paul, 1958, An exact consumption-loan model of interest with or
without the social contrivance of money. Journal of Political Economy 66,
December, 467-82.
